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Abstract

ter observing two consecutive runs of the protocol. The attacker is able to learn the difference
between consecutive session keys and forumlate
guesses on the subsequent session keys. In approximately 1/16th of the cases, the session key will
have a special property. Our attack exploits certain
statistical properties of the bitstring and determines
the correct key value with high probability.
Vajda and Buttyán present an active attack
against their SUBSET protocol, which requires
more than 256 queries for their parameters. We
detail an active attack that requires only 9 queries
under the same parameters. The attacker sends the
tag a specifically formatted query and sends a subsequent query formulated based on the previous response. We also present a passive attack that will
recover all bits with exponentially high probability.
Grain [2] is a lightweight stream cipher that was
designed for hardware applications with restricted
resources, such as memory and power consumption, and may be suitable for use in RFID tags. [1]
presents a cryptanalysis of Grain that recovers the
80-bit key.

Vajda and Buttyán proposed several lightweight
authentication protocols for authenticating RFID
tags to readers, and left open the quantifiable cryptographic strength. Our cryptanalysis answers this
open question by implementing and measuring attacks against their XOR and SUBSET protocols. A
passive eavesdropper can impersonate a tag in the
XOR protocol after observing only 70 challengeresponse transactions between the tag and reader.
In contrast, the theoretical maximum strength of the
XOR protocol could have required 16! ∗ 2 observed
transactions to break the key. Our experiments also
show that a passive eavesdropper can recover the
shared secret used in the XOR protocol by observing an expected 1,092 transactions. Additionally,
a nearly optimal active attack against the SUBSET
protocol extracts almost one bit of information for
each bit emitted by the tag.

1

Introduction

Low-cost RFID tags are being increasingly used
in widespread applications such as inventory control, transit systems, livestock management, and
building access. Cryptography is needed to prevent unauthorized communication between tags and
readers. Vajda and Buttyán [3] developed several lightweight cryptographic protocols for lowcost tags. We show that their XOR and SUBSET
protocols provide inadequate protection from passive and active adversaries.

1.1

2. Vajda and Buttyán Protocol 1
Protocol 1 in Figure 1 is a challenge-response
protocol in which the tag and reader share a secret,
k (0) . To construct a challenge, the reader selects a
bitstring x uniformly at random. The reader transmits a(i) = x(i) ⊕ k (i) to the tag, where i is the
ith transaction between the reader and tag. k (i) is
calculated by a permutation of k (0) . Because x(i)
is random, a(i) is also random. In an informationtheoretic sense, a(i) reveals nothing about the secret
k (0) .
The tag uses its knowledge of k (i) to extract
(i)
x . The tag then responds to the reader with
b(i) = x(i) ⊕k (0) . Knowing x(i) and k (0) , the reader

Background

For their XOR protocol, Vajda and Buttyán [3]
detail a possible passive attack that involves guessing the session keys by a brute force attack af1
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a ⊕ (k(i−2) ⊕ k(0) ) = x(i) ⊕ k(0)

2. Tag computes

(0)

a(i) ⊕ k(i) ⊕ k(0) = x(i) ⊕ k(0)

3a. Mallory sends

b(i) = x(i) ⊕ k(0)
Figure 1. Steps 1-4 of VB protocol 1. The tag knows k (0) and the permutation to calculate
k (i) . The tag extracts x(i) from the challenge to form a valid response. Steps 2a and 3a
show how an active adversary can implement the Repeated Keys Attack to successfully
impersonate a tag. Mallory knows k (i−2) ⊕k (0) after observing a challenge/response pair
from an earlier transaction between the reader and tag. In this example, the session key
is repeated every 2 cycles. Thus, k (i−2) = k (i) , and Mallory can form a valid response
without knowing x(i) , k (i) , or k (0) .

k (i) = k (i+c) . The average cycle period is 2, meaning that k (i) = k (i+2) . The minimum cycle period
was 1, which occurred in 31.9% of our results. All
of the observed keys eventually repeat, and the maximum cycle period was 36, which occurred in only
1 out of the 1,000 sessions.
Session key cycles lead to our first attack, which
allows an active adversary to successfully impersonate a tag. We also developed an active and passive attack that, independent of session key cycles,
allows an adversary to gain full knowledge of k (0) .

can verify the correctness of the tag’s response.
The protocol is considered broken when an adversary can send a valid b(i) = x(i) ⊕ k (0) or learn
the value of k (0) . [3] notes that a passive attacker
can learn k (i) ⊕ k (i+1) after observing two consecutive transactions of the protocol. However, they
suggest that an attacker must use a brute force attack to guess the session key k (i) and completely
break the protocol, which requires as many as 16!∗2
guesses, for the 128-bit example.
We demonstrate two types of attacks against Protocol 1. First is an active attack based on key sequence cycles that obtains the value x(i) ⊕ k (0) and
can successfully impersonate a tag after observing
an average of 70 transactions. The second attack is
independent of key cycles and can fully recover k (0)
in 1092 expected guesses.

2.1

2.2

Repeated Keys Attack

An active adversary, Mallory, can learn k (i) ⊕
k
after observing one challenge/response pair.
As shown in Figure 1, Mallory learns a(i) = x(i) ⊕
k (i) and b(i) = x(i) ⊕ k (0) , and can calculate their
bitwise difference to learn k (i) ⊕ k (0) . He builds a
table with k (i) ⊕k (0) , k (i+1) ⊕k (0) , k (i+2) ⊕k (0) , . . .
rows. Two rows will have the same value when
the session key repeats, allowing the attacker to
determine the key cycle period. Without loss of
generality, assume that the key cycle period is 2.
Thus, k (i−2) = k (i) . As Figure 1 shows, when the
reader sends x(i) ⊕ k (i) , the attacker can calculate
(x(i) ⊕ k (i) ) ⊕ (k (i−2) ⊕ k (0) ) = x(i) ⊕ k (0) . This
forms a valid response which the attacker can then
broadcast to the reader, thus successfully impersonating a valid tag.
(0)

Implementation

We implemented the 128-bit key length example from [3] and generated 1,000 sessions with
10,000 transactions per session, i.e. we generated
1,000 different k (0) values and permuted each one
10,000 times. Figure 2 shows that the session keys
k (1) , . . . , k (i) , . . . , k (10,000) cycle after an average
of 68 permutations. That is, the permutation resulted in a repeating pattern of session keys after
an average of 68 sessions. For a cycle period of c,
2
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Figure 2. This histogram shows that keys repeat much earlier than the 16! ∗ 2 theoretical
maximum. 1,000 instances of the VB protocol 1 with random K (0) ’s execute until a key
repeats. A key repeats on average after 68 transactions between a tag and reader.

sary to learn k (i) ⊕ k (i+1) after observing two consecutive runs of the protocol. Mallory constructs a
table as in Figure 3 and looks at the Indicator column for ‘0000’ in the second nibble. When this oc(i)
(i+1)
curs, he knows that k0,R = k0,R because their
bitwise difference is ‘0000.’ Thus, he also knows
(i)
that k0,L = 0. He can use column 1 to calculate

In 68.8% of the sessions we generated, the key
cycle period is 2 or less. If the attacker begins
eavesdropping with the first transaction between the
reader and tag, he can detect a repeated key cycle and impersonate a tag after 70 transactions. If
the adversary begins eavesdropping after 68 transactions, then, on average, he can impersonate the
tag after observing just 3 transactions.

2.3

(i)

Nibble Attack

Passive attack: [3] gives an example using 128bit key lengths. The permutation Π(k (i) ) = k (i+1)
is defined as follows. First cut each byte of k (i)
in half to obtain two nibbles. The left nibbles
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
k0,L , k1,L , . . . , k15,L form kL and the right nibbles
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i+1)

(i) th
k0,L ,

st

k0,R , k1,R , . . . , k15,R form kR . kR
th

by swapping the 0
. . ., 15th and

(i) th
k15,L

and

elements of

1

(0)

and he can use the table to calculate k1,L . We can
(0)

is formed
(i) th

Active attack: Our passive attack algorithm can
also be employed as an active attack. Mallory
first sends the tag a string of 00 s. When a tag
receives a challenge a(i) , it always responds with
a(i) ⊕k (i) ⊕k (0) . Thus Mallory will learn k (i) ⊕k (0)
by sending a challenge of all 00 s to the tag. He
can continue to sends challenges of all 00 s to learn
k (i+1) ⊕ k (0) , k (i+2) ⊕ k (0) , etc. and construct a
table similar to Figure 3. The same analysis from
the passive attack can be employed to determine the
full value of k (0) .

and k1,L ,

(i+1)
kR .

(i+1)
kL

is

formed in a similar way using
(i)
Observe that if k0,L = 0, then the first four bits
(i) th

of k (i) are equal to 0. The 0th and the k0,L
(i)
k0,R

(0)

use this reasoning to find all nibbles of kL and kR
and learn the full value of k (0) , thus breaking the
scheme completely.

(i)
kR .

(i)
k0,R

(0)

x0,L and then use column 2 to determine k0,L .
Using similar reasoning, he can find rows in the
Indicator column where the fourth nibble is ‘0000,’
(i)
(i+1)
(i)
which indicates that k1,R = k1,R . Thus k1,L = 1

ele-

(i+1)
k0,R

ments of
are switched. Hence,
=
and the permutation Π resulted in no change to
(i)
(i)
k0,R , and thus we know that k0,L = 0. This event
will happen for roughly a 1/16th -fraction of values
(i)
(i)
i. Knowing k0,L = 0, we can compute x0,L and
(0)

therefore k0,L .
As noted in [3], it is possible for a passive adver-

Remark We note that there are cases in which a
(i)
(i+1)
nibble is swapped twice, such that k0,R = k0,R
3

R→T
x(i) ⊕ k (i)
x(i+1) ⊕ k (i+1)
x(i+2) ⊕ k (i+2)

T →R
x(i) ⊕ k (0)
x(i+1) ⊕ k (0)
x(i+2) ⊕ k (0)

Leak
k (i) ⊕ k (0)
k (i+1) ⊕ k (0)
k (i+2) ⊕ k (0)

Indicator
k (i−1) ⊕ k (i)
k (i) ⊕ k (i+1)
k (i+1) ⊕ k (i+2)

Figure 3. Information Leaked by Protocol 1. The first and second columns are the
observed challenge and response, respectively. The Leak column is the bitwise difference between the first two columns, and the Indicator column is the bitwise difference
between rows in the Leak column. When our algorithm finds a ‘0000’ nibble in the Indicator column, it combines this with information from the Leak column to calculate a
nibble of k (0) .

(i)

a ⊕ kL and y = b ⊕ kR . The tag then responds to
the reader with selected portions of x indexed by y,
as detailed below. Knowing x and y, the reader can
verify the correctness of the tag’s response.
While a challenge alone in this protocol leaks no
information, a challenge-response pair does leak a
considerable amount. Vajda and Buttyán note this
leakage, but hypothesize that it is about one bit
per protocol invocation. They suggest, therefore,
that their challenge-response protocol may be suitable for practical scenarios in which hundreds of accesses to a tag are impractical for an attacker.
We demonstrate an active attack against Protocol
2 that recovers kL and kR almost optimally, in the
sense that the attack extracts nearly one bit of information from every bit emitted by the tag. In other
words, the security of Protocol 2 is nearly no better
than that of a protocol in which the tag directly reveals a portion of its key in response to a challenge.

and k0,L 6= 0. Thus, Mallory needs to find two
cases with a ‘0000’ nibble. If the values calculated
(0)
for k0,L agree, then this is the correct value with
high probability. Otherwise, he must find a third
nibble and take the majority value. A false positive
1
cases, because the ‘0000’ actually ococcurs in 15
curs in one of the other 15 positions. Mallory must
find two ‘0000’ nibbles (16 expected trials to find
1
1
each) and find a third in 15
+ 15
of the cases. This
1
1
+ 15
)) = 1092
results in 32 ∗ (16 + 16 + 16 ∗ ( 15
expected trials to fully recover all 32 nibbles of k (0) .
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Vajda and Buttyán Protocol 2

Protocol 2 is a challenge-response protocol in
which the tag and reader share two secrets, kL and
kR .
To construct a challenge, the reader selects two
bitstrings x and y uniformly at random. The reader
transmits a = x⊕kL and b = y ⊕kR to the tag. Because x and y are random, a and b are also random.
In an information-theoretic sense, the pair (a, b) reveals nothing about the secrets kL and kR .
The secrets kL and kR effectively act as “masks”
to conceal the challenge values x and y. The tag
uses its knowledge of kL and kR to extract x =

Protocol details: Let l and m be security parameters. The secret kL has bit-length l, a power of 2.
The other secret, kR , has bit-length m log2 l. Let
kR = kR,1 k . . . k kR,m , i.e., we partition the
secret into m substrings, each of bit-length log2 l.
As we have explained, x and y are random bit
strings. By analogy with our notation for kR , let
y = y1 k . . . k ym . A challenge consists of a pair
(a = x ⊕ kL , b = y ⊕ kR ). The response of the
tag comprises selected bits of x; the tag determines
which bits of x to return to the reader by treating
y1 , ...ym as indices into x. Let x[i] denote the ith
bit of x for 0 ≤ i ≤ log2 l (with either big-endian
or little-endian notation). See Figure 4 for a concise
protocol specification.

a = x ⊕ kL
b = (y1 ⊕ kR,1 ) || . . . || (ym ⊕ kR,m )
Reader

Tag

c = x[y1 ], x[y2 ], . . . , x[ym ]

Overview of active attack: Vajda and Buttyán
describe an active attack involving l queries to the

Figure 4. VB protocol 2
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tag that recovers kL . We refer the reader to [3] for
details. As an example, they consider l = 256 and
m = 16. They hypothesize that an active attacker
requires at leastS 256 queries to break their scheme.
We show that considerably fewer queries suffice.
The active attack that we describe first recovers
kR in log2 l + 1 queries—9 queries for the suggested parameters l = 256 and m = 16. The attack then fully recovers kL with at most dl/me additional queries—i.e., 16 queries for the suggested
parameters in [3], amounting to a total of 25 queries
for the full attack.
The attack is nearly optimal in the following
sense. The total bit length of the shared secrets
kR and kL is D = l + m log2 l, while our attack involves a total bit output from the tag of
(dl/me + log2 l + 1)m ≤ D + 2m bits. Viewed
another way, our attack is optimal to within two
queries—and only one query when l is divisible by
m. (The attack could be further optimized somewhat, but the gains would be small, of course.)

Hence, with log2 l + 1 queries, we may recover kR
completely.
With knowledge of kR , we can quickly recover
kL . Suppose (a, b, c) is a given challenge-response
tuple. Using kR , we can create a value b that corresponds to any sequence of indices y1 , . . . , ym we
desire. We know that c[i] = x[yi ]. Therefore, c[i] =
a[yi ] ⊕ kL [yi ], and hence kL [yi ] = a[yi ] ⊕ c[i]. In
other words, by setting b as desired and using a random vector a, we may recover any m desired bits in
kL . Thus, dl/me queries suffices to recover all of
xL .

Attack details: Let us denote by a(j) , b(j) , and
c(j) the protocol values in the j th query, for j =
0, 1, . . . , log2 l. Let c(j) [i] denote the ith bit of the
tag response.
The attack is as follows. Let j 0 = log2 l − j. We
0
construct the vector a(j) as a sequence of 2j ‘0’
0
0
bits, followed by 2j ‘1’ bits, then 2j ‘0’ bits, etc.,
up to the full length of l bits. In other words, we let
a(0) = 00 . . . 00, i.e., the all-0s string. We let a(1) =
00 . . . 0011 . . . 11, i.e., the first half consists of 0s,
then second half of 1s. The final query, a(log2 l) ,
consists of alternating ‘0’ and ‘1’ bits.
For all j, we let b(j) = ~0, i.e., b is a string of 0
bits. (This is a matter of convenience. It is easy to
modify the attack such that b is any desired value in
any query.) In query q, we challenge the tag with
the pair (a(j) , b(j) ).
Since b(j) = ~0, for any i, we have yi = kR,i .
Therefore, c[i] = x[kR,i ]. Now observe that for any
0 ≤ i ≤ log2 l, if the leading bit kR,i [0] = 0, then
c(0) [i] = c(1) [i], since kR,i indexes the first half of
the vector a, which is constant across the 0th and
1st queries. Otherwise c(0) [i] 6= c(1) [i]. Similarly,
if kR,i [1] = 0, then we observe c(0) [i] = c(2) [i];
otherwise c(0) [i] 6= c(2) [i]. Similar comparisons
across queries reveal the remaining bits of kR,i .
Thus, for any i, log2 l + 1 queries suffice to recover
kR,i in its entirety. Furthermore, we may recover
kR,i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m independently in parallel.

The Vajda and Buttyán protocols 1 and 2 have inherent weaknesses that render them inadequate for
tag authentication. With few resources, an attacker
can determine the session keys for both of the protocols, breaking the schemes completely.

Remark: The authors propose a method of
strengthening their scheme by using linear combinations of overlapping sets of y to select bits from
x. Our hypothesis is that any such scheme would
still not provide adequate cryptographic strength for
most practical settings.
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Conclusion
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